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PERSONHOOD:
THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
J. BRAXTON CRAVEN, JR.*
The great freedoms enumerated in the first ten amendments to the
Constitution are known to most Americans by name--speech, press,
religion, etc. But there is another great freedom that has not yet been
christened. It is so vast that a single word does not encompass it. It is
not an enumerated or "fundamental" freedom,' but to the average man,
who may not wish to make a speech or print a newspaper, it may be the
greatest freedom of them all. The right to be let alone is the only non-
political protection for that vast array of human activities which, consid-
ered separately, may seem trivial,2 but together make up what most
individuals think of as freedom. I am thinking of little things, mostly
taken for granted, such as the right to attend a football game, to refrain
from attending a political rally, to wear a hat, or to ride a bicycle to
work through city traffic. I am concerned for these freedoms because
judicial consideration of them is presently unstructured. Because
judges do not know how to treat them, there is a danger that they will be
undervalued in the courts. 3 Although I do not think that these rights
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1. Irving Brant undertook the task of compilation and uncovered sixty-three
specific guarantees contained in the Constitution and its amendments. I. BRANT, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 8-15 (1965). Counting seven principles of government, "the first of
which is the existence of a written Constitution," id. at 8, Brant concluded that there
were twenty-four elements of a bill of rights in the original Constitution. Taking account
of multiple protections in a single amendment, he added thirty guarantees of freedom
derived from the first ten amendments, making fifty-four "rights" "that date back to the
beginning of our present form of government." Id. at 14. Mr. Brant added nine liber-
tarian provisions derived from the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth and
twenty-fourth amendments, "asserted either as positive rights or as restraints upon state
action," id. at 15, making a grand total of sixty-three specific guarantees contained in
the Constitution and its amendments and constituting our American Bill of Rights. Id.
2. The Supreme Court is aware that lesser rights may be as highly valued as more
fundamental ones. In assessing the magnitude of the right to travel abroad, the Supreme
Court expressed its awareness of the importance of other "lesser" rights:
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a liveli-
hood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what
he eats, or wears, or reads. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (empha-
sis added).
3. This Article will not attempt to vindicate these "lesser rights" against private
parties. This fight appears to be best left to legislative, rather than judicial, innovation.
Cf. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
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depend upon the doctrine of substantive due process, 4 there is undenia-
bly a relationship and the demise of that doctrine threatens their vindica-
tion.
Under the currently sanctioned judicial approach, a litigant chal-
lenging a state regulation in a federal court must first demonstrate that
such regulation infringes upon an enumerated or fundamental right.5 If
he is successful in meeting this burden, the state will be called upon to
show that, nevertheless, the regulation is justified as promoting a "com-
pelling" state interest.0 This approach works quite well where the
individual, perhaps with some help from the Justices,7 is able to trace his
asserted interest to its constitutional source. The list of such rights,
however, is obviously exhaustible. At some point between the right to
have an abortion" and the right to an education9 the constitutional
framework becomes overburdened. Under the current approach, hav-
ing failed to establish his asserted right as "fundamental," the litigant is
normally left remediless. 10 Thus legislatures are left virtually free,
4. Substantive due process is synonymous with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute regulating the
hours a baker could work on the grounds that the statute interfered with the right of
contract between an employer and his employees, a right found to be part of the liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 53. Lochner is the paradigm of
"legislative" judicial review. It has long been disparaged as an extreme example of the
judicial branch substituting its judgment for that of Congress and state legislatures. See
Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REv.
943 (1927); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhuma-
tion and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. Rev. 34, 36-40.
5. The Supreme Court has labeled "fundamental" those rights which are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Although the precise scope of this definition has never been determined, see Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1947), it is certain that some rights not explicitly
named in the Constitution are nonetheless protected. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
6. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
7. For example, counsel for appellants in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), asserted that a right to use contraceptives could be derived from the guarantees
of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. Brief for Appellant at 79-
83. Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion found that the right was a part of the
"penumbra" formed by emanations from these amendments. 381 U.S. at 484. See
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 228-29 (1965).
See also Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 9 VILL. L.
REv. 833 (1974); Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The Right of Privacy Revisited, 21
U. KAN. L. REv. 527 (1973).
8. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
9. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
10. Absent a fundamental right, the state need only show a rational relation between
the regulation in question and a legitimate state interest. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963). See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
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within political bounds, to honor or deny at their pleasure rights of
persons that are not "fundamental."
This Article will suggest how these less important rights-which can
be collectively termed a right of "personhood"--can be given meaning-
ful protection without awakening the long dormant shade of Lochner.
What I suggest is the judicial recognition of a universal right of "person-
hood" which protects individuals from arbitrary and capricious govern-
mental action, but which, in appropriate situations, can be outweighed
by a demonstrated state interest." This right, while concededly not
"fundamental" in stature, comes within the protection of the ninth
amendment' 2 and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 3 Actions alleging violations of this right should, there-
11. An implied additional requirement is that the alleged state interest be sufficient
to outweigh the state's frequently overlooked interest in fostering a society which values
individual liberty. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1430-
31 (1974).
12. The ninth amendment states that the Constitution's enumeration of some rights
"shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNST.
amend. IX; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded
Law of Privacy?, 64 MicH. L. REV. 197, 207 (1965). While I agree with Professor
Monaghan that the ninth amendment is a bottomless and presently empty well if viewed
as a source of fundamental rights, Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HAxv. L. REy. 1, 45 (1975), I do think that
it clearly indicates an intention by the framers to provide some constitutional protection
for lesser rights. See Comment, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process, The
Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wisc. L. REV. 922, 927-28. See
generally Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Rhoades & Patula, The Ninth Amendment: A Survey
of Theory and Practice in the Federal Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DENVER
L.J. 153 (1973).
13. No person shall be "deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law."
U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the scope of
this guarantee is broad:
Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great
precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint.
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual
is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental
objective. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
The First Circuit expressed the same thought in a high school hair regulation case:
"[Lliberty" seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the
right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those per-
sonal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability of others
to enjoy their liberty. . . . Indeed, a narrower view of liberty in a free society
might, among other things, allow the state to require a conventional coiffure
of all its citizens, a governmental power not unknown in European history.
We think the Founding Fathers understood themselves to be limiting the
government's power to intrude into this sphere of personal liberty by reserving
some powers to the people. . . . The Founding Fathers wrote an amendment
for speech and assembly; even they did not deem it necessary to write an
amendment for personal appearance. We conclude that within the commodi-
ous concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear
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fore, be cognizable in the federal courts.14
It is too soon to attempt a precise definition of the term "person-
hood." The term, which originated with Professor Paul Freund, 5
includes elements of the concepts of individuality, autonomy, and priva-
cy, but none of these words is sufficient. 6 The "right to be let alone"
expresses the idea, but those words have become too much associated
with fourth amendment-type freedom. The original meaning of the
phrase, however, as captured by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,17 comes very close to the principle which I
have in mind:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favor-
able to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Gov-
ernment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 8
one's hair as he wishes. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st
Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
14. Federal judicial power extends "to all Cases . .. arising under [the] Constitu-
tion . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
15. In his dinner address to the American Law Institute on May 23, 1975, Professor
Freund said:
The theme of personhood is ... emerging. It has been groping, I think,
for a rubric. Sometimes it is called privacy, inaptly it would seem to me; au-
tonomy perhaps, though that seems too dangerously broad. But the idea is that
of personhood in the sense of those attributes of an individual which are irre-
ducible in his selfhood. We all know the agonizing judgments that have had
to be made and that will have to be made in such diverse areas as abortion
and the death penalty, which it seems to me are aspects of this issue of person-
hood. In the future, this issue is likely to loom ever larger as we see advances
in the biomedical sciences that will lead to genetic engineering and the kinds
of precise behavior control that will test our conceptions of individual responsi-
bility and individuality. AMERICAN LAW INSTTuTE, 52ND ANNUAL MEETING
42-43 (1975).
16. "Privacy" has acquired a secondary meaning since Warren and Brandeis used the
term some 86 years ago to refer to protection of one's papers and effects from disclosure
and publication by the media. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
Rnv. 193 (1890). I suppose the paradigm of this sort of right of privacy was illustrated
on the CBS program Sixty Minutes on December 21, 1975, when it was contended that
the right of privacy protects the identity of a medical doctor who grossed almost
$500,000 in Medicaid payments from the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare. That is not what I have in mind.
17. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53
(1967).
18. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Personhood is, as Professor Freund put it, "groping . . . for a
rubric."19  Perhaps, though, if we turn to our traditions, and resort to
the case method, theory and a name will emerge.
The need for a doctrine of personhood as well as the shortcomings
of the current judicial approach are illustrated by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Kelley v. Johnson.20 The case involved a challenge to
a police department's hair grooming regulation. The Court had previ-
ously refused to consider "hair cases,"'" despite the fact that the circuits
have reached inconsistent results and have employed varying ap-
proaches2 2-a schoolboy in the Fourth Circuit has a greater constitu-
tional interest in his hairstyle than does his contemporary to the south.23
Kelley provided the Court with an opportunity to relieve us of this
strange situation.
In earlier times, the Court would likely have presented the dissident
officer with a simple choice: get a haircut or quit the force.24 Public em-
ployment has since been recognized as a right rather than a privilege 2r
and the government is restrained from conditioning employment upon the
employee's relinquishment of another constitutional right.2 Following
this analysis, the Kelley Court set out to decide Whether a policeman has
a constitutional right to wear his hair in a style that pleases him. This
task did not prove to be difficult. There is not one word or clause or
19. See note 15 supra.
20. 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976).
21. We had previously been given a few glimpses of the Court's attitude toward
constitutional challenges to hair regulations. Mr. Justice Black, for example, disdainfully
denied a motion to vacate a stay of injunction in Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201
(1971):
The only thing about [the case] that borders on the serious to me is the idea
that anyone should think the Federal Constitution imposes on the United
States courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that public school
students should wear. Id. at 1202-03.
Mr. Justice Douglas was somewhat more sympathetic to the plight of longhaired
schoolboys. See Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972)
(dissenting from denial of cert.); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 U.S.
856 (1968) (dissenting from denial of cert.).
22. See notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
23. Compare Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972), with Karr v. Schmidt,
460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
24. As Mr. Justice (then Judge) Holmes stated in a first amendment context: "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517 (1892).
25. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1463-64 (1968).
26. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (citing cases); see
Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the
Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 751 (1969).
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phrase in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights addressed to hirsute ap-
pearance. That leaves us with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment or the penumbras of the first -ten amendments. It is
true that the Supreme Court has gone beyond the face of the Bill of
Rights to find several fundamental rights27 and has established a some-
what vague zone of autonomy around individuals to shield them from
overly intrusive governmental action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,28 the
Court held that a married couple's use of contraceptives was within this
zone,2" and in Roe v. Wade,30 this fundamental right of privacy was
deemed "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy." 31 The momentousness of these decisions,
however, suggests that this method of constitutional adjudication would
not be extended to cover the comparatively trivial individual decision of
when to visit a barber.32 This, of course, was what the Court decided.
Since the policeman had no fundamental right to groom his hair as he
wished, he was not entitled to Roe-type protection and the state was only
required to pass the rational relationship test.33
But Roe-type protection is extreme. It virtually preempts the field
in favor of the person and against the state. There must be something in
between, and, if there is, personhood is not doomed.
That an asserted right cannot be found in the Constitution ought to
be the beginning of inquiry rather than the end of it. How many
personal rights of Americans are there? Has anyone ever attempted a
compilation?3 4 I suppose the beginning point of analysis is the recogni-
tion of a basic weakness in the Constitution. As Mr. Brant stated, the
document "as a charter of freedom . . . was woefully deficient. 35
27. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Id. at 485.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Id. at 153.
32. For a consideration of possible constitutional sources of a right to wear long hair,
see 84 HARV. L. REv. 1702, 1707-12 (1971).
33. The state easily passed this test, asserting that the hair regulation promoted the
governmental interest in having an identifiable police force and in maintaining the esprit
de corps of the gendarmerie. 96 S. Ct. at 1446.
34. See note 1 supra.
35. BRANT, supra note 1, at 3. It is interesting to note that the right to assemble,
certainly now deemed fundamental, almost escaped constitutional recognition. Mr.
Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that it was "derogatory to the dignity of the House to
descend to such minutiae. . ." and equated freedom of assembly with the right of a man
"to wear his hat if he pleased; . . . get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he
thought proper. . . ." Id. at 54.
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This is because the founders were not primarily concerned with the
safeguarding and implementation of personal liberty36 but concentrated
instead upon the matter at hand: the establishment of a national govern-
ment. Even the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution as a
second thought, mostly to pacify recalcitrant states37 and recalcitrant
people in all the states. As Professor Goebel pointed out, the Constitu-
tional Convention was not preoccupied with liberty. Indeed, "no word
in the vocabulary of contemporary politics was used less often. Neither
the task nor the idiom of discussion required it. 'We are not working
on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society,' wrote
Randolph, 'but upon those rights modified by society and interwoven
with what we call the rights of states.' "38 The phrase "blessings of
liberty" was put into the Preamble as a last-minute inspiration of
Gouverneur Morris and was not even debated. 39
It is significant that the very form of recognition of personal rights
in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is in the negative. Nowhere is
there an affirmative grant of rights to the people. Instead, the whole
document with respect to the rights of persons is a negative series of
restrictions upon the power of government. Three sets of words-in
the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and
the ninth amendment-make it clear, beyond argument I think, that the
36. Many of the founders believed in natural law. North Carolina's "Declaration of
Rights," laid before the Congress before we joined the Union, is typical of many adopted
in the States. The first proposition reads as follows:
1. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form
a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 4 J. EL-
LIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 243 (1937) (empha-
sis added).
37. North Carolina, for example. Even North Carolinians did not think that the Bill
of Rights was an exhaustive enumeration of the rights retained by the people. Hear
James Iredell:
The gentleman says that unalienable rights ought not to be given up. Those
rights which are unalienable are not alienated. They still remain with the
great body of the people. If any right be given up that ought not to be, let
it be shown. Say it is a thing which affects your country, and that it ought
not to be surrendered: this would be reasonable. But when it is evident that
the exercise of any power not given up would be an usurpation, it would be
not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights which are
not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest
manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by
the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate
every one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he
pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained
in it. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 36, at 166-67 (emphasis added).
38. 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 238 (1971) (Vol. 1 of Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise series).
39. Id.
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rights of persons in the United States are not confined to those specifi-
cally recognized. The Declaration declares it to be true that "all men
are endowed, by their creator, with certain unalienable rights [and] that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."40  Indeed,
these rights are so important that it is for the very purpose of securing
them that governments are instituted among men. The Declaration says
so. Faithful to that purpose the Constitution was ordained and estab-
lished "to promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."41 And consistent with both, the
ninth amendment provides that the enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.42
To define liberty is to confine it and to that extent to deny it. How
many words, how many pages, how many volumes, would it take to
delineate perfectly every right of a person residing in these United
States? It is mind-boggling to contemplate merely listing every item of
food that one may lawfully consume. It would be a frightening task if
undertaken with the knowledge that inadvertent omission of bluefish
would mean pompano forever. If every area of human activity were
included, and it would have to be upon pain of deprivation, I should
think a new Library of Congress would be needed to house only one copy
of these laws of permission.
If we must abandon the idea of a compilation of all of the rights of
man, and I think we must, then it seems to me we are driven to an
opposite position. An individual should retain the right to engage in
any form of activity unless there exists a countervailing state interest of
sufficient weight to justify restricting his conduct. This is the essence of
personhood: a rebuttable presumption that all citizens have a right to
conduct their lives free of government regulation. At a minimum,
personhood should encompass "the freedom to do everything which
injures no one else."4 3 In John Stuart Mill's words:
40. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
41. U.S. CoNsT. preamble.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
787, 787-93 (1959).
43. Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), reprinted in THE CON-
STITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE
1789-1907 (Anderson ed, 1967). It is indeed unsettling that this idea is nearly as
revolutionary today as it was in 1789. Recent decisions dealing with private sexual
activity, however, indicate that the liberation of "victimless" conduct from state super-
vision is a long way off. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, No. 73-2337 (4th Cir. May 12,
1976) (holding that the enforcement of a state anti-sodomy statute did not violate a
married couple's right to marital privacy because of a third party's participation in the
prohibited activity); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
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As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question
whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfer-
ing with it becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for enter-
taining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests
of no persons besides himself . . . . In all such cases, there should
be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the
consequences. 44
For example, all would agree that there is a "right" to wear a bathing
suit on a public beach. Controversy begins as the suit diminishes. The
proper question is not whether a person can or must wear a suit (who
would say he must in his own bathtub?) but whether the state's interest
in decorous and moral behavior is of greater weight in the particular
instance.45
Now is an appropriate time to return to the problem of hair. As
stated earlier,40 the federal courts of appeals which have been confront-
ed with hair cases have reached inconsistent results. Several of them,
including the Fourth Circuit, have found in cases concerning school hair
regulations that the right to govern one's personal appearance is one
aspect of the fundamental liberty protected by the due process clause.47 I
am now willing to concede that our brethren in the Fifth,48 Sixth,40
Ninth,50 and Tenth5 Circuits were right all along in deciding that there
is no fundamental right to have long hair, and I will also admit that their
position provided them with greater flexibility. 52  I think that the
1975), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976) (upholding the enforcement of the same
statute with regard to private homosexual activity).
44. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 92 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956).
45. At this point, we may have lost our friend John Stuart Mill %vho, I think, would
not agree that moral scruples are a sufficient societal interest to justify inhibiting the
individual:
Where not the person's own character but the traditions or customs of
other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal in-
gredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and
social progress. Id. at 68.
46. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
47. Stull v. School Board, 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972), overruled, Zeller v.
Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 608 (3d Cir. 1975) (see notes 54-55
infra and accompanying text); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972);
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259,
1263 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
48. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972).
49. Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1971).
50. King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971).
51. Freeman v. Fluke, 448 F.2d 258, 260-61 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1032 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972),
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dichotomy of results, however, is primarily a function of the strained
form of constitutional analysis which we all felt obliged to apply. Those
of us who felt that the state was overreaching in attempting to keep hair
off the schoolboys' ears and collars were faced with the choice of either
finding a constitutional source for the plaintiff's asserted right or up-
holding the regulation. Under the doctrine of Ferguson v. Skrupa, 3
there was no middle ground. Problems were encountered when, in
subsequent cases, the state's asserted interest appeared more significant.
In Zeller v. Donegal School District Board of Education,4 for example,
the Third Circuit was put in the embarrassing position of having to
withdraw the fundamental right of personal appearance which they had
previously extended to schoolboys in order to uphold what they now felt
to be a legitimate school regulation.55 The Eighth Circuit was forced to
assign "compelling interest" status to the government's concern for "the
maintenance of an efficient and disciplined police force" and public
confidence in order to uphold a regulation of police hair styles.5
In the Fourth Circuit, we suffered intramurally and managed to
keep most of our anguish out of the Federal Reporter. In Schott v. Forn-
off0 7 we overturned a very specific grooming regulation promulgated by a
police chief. 8  In that short per curiam opinion there is not one word
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (upholding the right of college students to wear their
hair as they please).
53. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
54. 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975).
55. The plaintiff had been excluded from the school soccer team for failure to get a
haircut. Although only a plurality of four judges joined in the main opinion, a fifth
judge agreed that there was no fundamental right involved. Id. at 610 (Rosenn, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
56. Stranley v. Anderson, 478 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1973). The author of the
opinion, Judge Lay, later recanted. Rinehart v. Brewer, 491 F.2d 705, 707 n.1 (8th Cir.
1974) (dissenting opinion).
57. 515 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1975).
58. The regulation read in pertinent part:
HAIR All male police, cadet and civilian personnel will wear their hair neatly
trimmed and tapered to the sides of the head and to the back of the neck.
SIDEBURNS Will be neatly trimmed and will not extend below the mid-
point of the Tragus of the ear. The Tragus is identified as the prominence
in front of the external opening of the ear.
MUSTACHES No hair will extend down over the upper lip nor extend past
either side of the mouth, and must be kept trimmed at all times.
In addition, the regulation included a diagram of a male haircut that conformed to the
Chief's expectations. This diagram showed that (1) hair was to extend to a maximum
height of two inches above the skull after combing; (2) the maximum thickness of
sideburns was to be one-quarter inch; (3) there was to be a one-inch clearance between
the collar and the hairline on the back of the head; (4) there was to be a one-quarter
inch clearance at all points between the hair on the side of the head and the ear
(referred to as the "antiseptic white sidewall rule"). Brief for Appellant, app. at 15,
Schott v. Fornoff, 515 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1975).
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about Officer Schott's right to wear his hair longer than pleased the
Chief. We did not equate his haircut with a personal right deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and therefore
included in the guarantee of personal privacy.59 From reading the
opinion one cannot even discern recognition on our part that Schott had
a right to have any hair at all, much less to decide how it should be cut.
Without considering Schott's hair, it was held simply that the hair
regulation was so extreme in respect to appearance and cut that it could
not be said to bear a rational relationship to the constitutionally permis-
sible objective of administering a police department and, in short, was
arbitrary and capricious. There is not even an echo of the command in
more fundamental areas that sound almost like "Congress shall make no
law. . . ." Clearly the implication of the opinion is that the state may
enter the field, may regulate the appearance of its police-but may not
do so without a reason, i.e., arbitrarily and capriciously. 60
Left on the cutting room floor, wisely in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelley, was a much longer draft which reached the
same result from another angle. In that opinion, we reaffirmed our hold-
ing in Massie v. Henry"' that the right to wear one's hair as he wishes is
"an aspect of the right to be secure in one's person guaranteed by the due
process clause... "62 which can be infringed upon only under special
circumstances not present in the case at hand. While we admitted that
the Chief was free to control ludicrous or bizarre appearance, we
concluded that the detrimental effect of Schott's hairstyle on police
morale and public confidence was not sufficient to overcome his asser-
tion of what we deemed a fundamental liberty.
The reason I am now inclined to favor the short per curiam opinion
that was filed over this longer proposed draft is that I think it more
accurately portrays how we arrived at our decision. We were willing to
acknowledge that appearance does have some bearing on the operation
of a police force, but the department in this case failed to show any loss
of public confidence and indeed admitted that Schott was chosen for
certain special assignments in part because of his attractive personal
appearance. It was unnecessary to decide whether or not tonsorial
appearance is constitutionally protected since, whatever its status, it
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
60. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Kelley v. Johnson, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976)
agreed that although the state's interests in an identifiable and well-motivated police force
are legitimate, hair length regulations bear no rational relationship to these goals. Id. at
1449-50.
61. 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972).
62. Id. at 783.
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outweighed the state's unsupportable interest in regulating such appear-
ance in this instance."3
More has been written about hair cases than the reader probably
wants to know. 4  Personhood, however, is not a narrow concept.
Included are those myriad activities, decisions, and idiosyncrasies which,
in the normal scheme of things, are not considered to be within the
ambit of fundamental rights. In a recent unreported case, for example,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia motorcycle
helmet law.05 The case, and our disposition of it, further convinced me
that personhood is not a fundamental liberty protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment or the penumbras of others,
63. Because we did not adjudicate the constitutional magnitude of the plaintiff's
asserted right, I believe that Schott survives Kelley v. Johnson, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976).
"The constitutional issue to be decided. . . " the Court stated, "is whether [the state's]
determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be
branded 'arbitrary'. . . ." Id. at 1446. In Schott we so held.
64. If not, see Comment, Long Hair and the Law: A Look at Constitutional and
Title Vii Challenges to Public and Private Regulation of Male Grooming, 24 U. KAN. L.
REV. 143 (1975); 84 HARv. L. REv. 1702 (1971).
65. United States v. Davy, No. 75-2215 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 1976). The entire opinion
reads as follows:
PER. CURIAM
Bruce R. Davy, convicted of riding a motorcycle without a helmet on the
George Washington Memorial Parkway, a violation of § 46.1-172 of the 1950
Code of Virginia (as amended), and made a federal offense by 18 U.S.C. §
13, appeals pro se, asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute which makes
mandatory the use of protective headgear while operating a motorcycle. He
urges that § 46.1-172 violates numerous segments of the United States Consti-
tution including the privileges and immunities clause (Art. IV, § 2), and the
ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amendments.
Essentially Davy's argument is that the statute in question should be char-
acterized as an unconstitutional exercise of the police power of the state. We
disagree. A state has broad powers to establish and enforce standards for the
purpose of protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954). Requiring safety helmets for motorcy-
clists is within the police power. See State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166
S.E.2d 49. Contra People v. Fries, 42 111. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
It is clear that unless the exercise of police power in question infringes
upon some constitutionally fundamental interest, it need only bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Friendship Medical Center,
Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). Since we do not find the right to ride a motor-
cycle helmetless to be a "personal right[ ] that can be deemed 'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . . . [and therefore] included
in [the] guarantee of personal privacy," we conclude that the traditional ra-
tional relationship test must be applied here. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973).
We hold that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting its cit-
izens from injuries and consequent ramifications which necessarily inhere from
involvement in accidents which arise from the operation of motorcycles.
Safety regulations requiring the wearing of helmets bear a rational relationship
to this valid governmental objective, and the statute is therefore constitutional.
See Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1020
(1972).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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but also reinforced my belief that this should not really matter. We
found that there existed legitimate governmental objectives which were
promoted by the law and, therefore, the "rational relationship" test was
met."6 We reached this conclusion, however, only after deciding that
the right to ride helmetless was not "fundamental," and, therefore, the
lesser standard applied. As any student of constitutional law knows,
the "rational relationship" test is, not particularly onerous, 7 at least
under due process analysis.68 If there is no fundamental right involved,
the court will uphold the statute where "any state of facts either known
or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it."69  If a
right of personhood were recognized, however, the analysis would go
something like this: (1) does the proscribed activity harm anyone other
than the actor?; (2) what is the state's interest in regulating this
conduct?; and (3) does this interest outweigh the individual's right to be
let alone? It should be apparent that, using this approach, personhood
may well encompass the right to disregard one's cranial well-being while
riding a motorcycle. It is at least arguable that no one other than the
rider is legitimately concerned with whether or not he wears a
helmet 7 -most states have had considerable difficulty in articulating a
justification for their statute other than a paternalistic concern for the
individual.7 ' Finally, even if a convincing rationale is put forth, the
social good to be achieved should be assessed in relation to the damage
done to the autonomy of the individual. This, of course, necessitates a
balancing of interests which may, and probably will, lead to seemingly
inconsistent results. The point is that the present mode of analysis, as
evidenced in United States v. Davy,U 7 2 also involves such balancing, but
hides the decision-making process under the rubric of fundamental
rights.
I have finally reached the crucial question: what is wrong with hav-
ing courts apply a balancing test when deciding a case involving a con-
frontation between a'non-fundamental right and a less than compelling
66. See note 65 supra.
67. Nevertheless, in a similar case, Michigan was unable to demonstrate the ration-
al connection between its motorcycle helmet law and the public health or welfare.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
68. See notes 95-112 infra and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
70. Compare American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158
N.W.2d 72 (1968), with Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass.), af 'd
mem., 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
71. Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legisla-
tion, 30 Omio ST. L.J. 355, 366-77 (1969).
72. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
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state interest? The Supreme Court has used such balancing in heavy-
weight bouts between fundamental rights and compelling state interests, 73
so why is it not applicable in the lower flights? I think the answer can
be given in one italicized word: Lochner.
Lochner v. New York 74 may not seem to have much to do with
personhood and even less to do with how one adorns or protects his
head. However, the Court's decision that New York had no business
telling a man how to run his bakery marked the high point of judicial
intervention in social and economic affairs. 75 A gradual abdication of
authority followed, culminating in 1963 in Ferguson v. Skrupa.7  In
that case, the Court officially buried Lochner and "returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies. ' 77
The resurgence of judicial intervention into the realm of social legis-
lation, however, has led some to wonder whether substantive due process
ever really died. In both Griswold v. Connecticut78 and Roe v. Wade7l
the Supreme Court struck down state statutes on the grounds that the
regulations infringed upon fundamental, but unenumerated, individual
rights. Concurring in Roe, Mr. Justice Stewart stated "that the Gris-
73. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), in which a teacher's
right of free expression was pitted against the state's interest, as an employer, in
providing efficient public services. The Court applied a balancing test and decided the
teacher's conduct did not sufficiently interfere with school operations to warrant his
dismissal. Id. at 572-73. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969) (student's first amendment rights outweigh state's interest in school order absent
threat of a "material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline").
74. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The majority opinion in Lochner was written by Mr.
Justice Peckham, of whom this story is told:
"What," [Dean Acheson] asked of [Mr. Justice Holmes], "was Justice Peck-
ham like intellectually?"
"Intellectually?," [Holmes] answered, puzzled. "I never thought of him
in that connection. His major premise was 'God damn it!' But he was a good
judge." D. ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 65 (1965).
75. See note 4 supra. Reexamination of the Court's language suggests that perhaps
the opinion was overread:
In every case that comes before this court. . . where the protection of the Fed-
eral Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, rea-
sonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the in-
dividual to his personal liberty. . .? 198 U.S. at 56.
I would suggest that a court which enforces the above standard is hardly overstepping its
proper authority.
76, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
77, Id. at 730. Skrupa closed a circle: the Court was willing to allow the
legislature to regulate business in 1877, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), and again
in 1963 in Skrupa, but not in 1905. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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wold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the
[anti-contraceptive] statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases
decided under the doctrine of substantive due process . *... ,80 Mr.
Justice Rehnquist has also suggested that Lochner and the recent cases
expanding the right of privacy (e.g., Griswold and Roe) are "sisters
under the skin."'  Is it possible, then, to reconcile the discredited
substantive due process of Lochner with the currently viable substantive
due process of Griswold and Roe? Moreover, has the door to wide-
spread judicial intervention been reopened by the Supreme Court's
recognition of fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution
which can only be overcome by an extraordinary state interest?
It seems to me that when we go outside the terms of the Constitution
and discover implied fundamental rights, we are necessarily imputing to
others our own set of priorities. Is it not unfair to do so except in the
extreme case where we can assert that reasonable men could not disa-
gree? I doubt not that it is important to the point of tears for some high
school students (or police officers) to wear their hair as they please, nor
that Mary Roe truly considered her right to terminate her pregnancy a
fundamental one. Similarly, however, I cannot say that Lochner did
not believe with equal fervor in his right to operate his small bakery as
he chose. Nor can I say that his belief was irrational; a majority of the
Supreme Court members at the time agreed with him. But I think it is
clear that in none of these cases would the aggrieved party find universal
support for his position, and that, therefore, ascribing "fundamental"
status to any of these rights would be somewhat disingenuous. To the
extent that the Court is willing to create fundamental rights in order to
provide constitutional protection in selected cases not involving enumer-
ated rights, I believe that the potential exists for a return to judicial
intervention in social and economic affairs as pervasive as that exercised
in the days of Lochner.
This judicially perceived necessity to find a fundamental right in
order to provide protection can be traced to the emasculation of the
"rational basis" test finalized in Ferguson v. Skrupa.12 We are left with
a situation in which "certain interests require particularly careful scruti-
80. Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).
81. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective
Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174
(1973) (dissenting opinion).
82. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
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ny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement 83 while
infringements of lesser interests require no scrutiny at all.
It seems to me that a better approach would be to reverse the order of
inquiry and focus first on the state interest asserted to justify a regula-
tion.84 The burden should first be placed on the state to show that the
purpose being pursued is legitimate and that the means employed are
reasonably related to this end. 5  This approach is not entirely inconsist-
ent with normal trial procedure if we accept that the individual's
right of personhood creates a presumption that all regulation of his
activity is invalid.8 6 By enacting a statute circumscribing his freedom,
or by denying him some benefit, the state is, in effect, filing a complaint
against him, alleging that his activity is causing some public harm. Since
it has initiated the complaint, the state should be made to show the
harm-to justify its regulation. This, of course, is the reasoning behind
the presumption of innocence in criminal cases. Shifting the initial
burden to the government also puts into fairer balance the capacity of
the litigants to develop the merits of the questions presented. Until
recently, the individual has almost always lost, not necessarily because
he was wrong, but often because of his inability to prove that he was
right. If you must prove that you have a right to practice TM or learn
karate or belly dancing, you may as well give up. Who will testify?
What exhibits will there be? On the other hand, the state has supposed-
83. Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. Judge Tuttle made this point in his concurring opinion in Sherling v. Townley,
464 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1972), a high school hair case:
It seems to me that the majority opinion in Karr posed the wrong question
when it stated it as follows: "Is there a constitutionally protected right to wear
one's hair in a public high school in the length and style that suits the wearer?"
I would say that the question before the court was rather, "May the principal
of a high school or the board of education of a county school system constitu-
tionally deny a public education to a student solely because he elects to wear
his hair longer than prescribed by the rigid requirements of the school board?"
Id. at 588.
My local radio commentator, not a lawyer, put it this way: "No nice kid will
perplex and outrage his elders with long hair, but on the other hand, no nice school
principal will expel a kid who does."
85. The idea of shifting the burden to the defendant in certain civil suits is not new.
See Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that "a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is not adventitious." Such a finding then "shifts to those authorities
the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the
result of intentionally segregative actions." Id. at 208. The underlying premise in
Keyes, that a history of state wrongdoing justifies the imposition of a presumption
against the validity of its acts, is also present in the area of personhood: what is history
but the story, repeated time and again, of liberty's miraculous escape from tyranny?
86. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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ly weighed the competing interests prior to enacting legislation or pro-
mulgating regulations, and hopes to achieve a certain result by its action.
It should be no problem for the state to recount its deliberations to the
court in order to rebut the presumption that the individual should be left
alone. This should take care of the frivolous cases. Where the state is
unable to articulate any reasons for its regulation, can we not reasonably
assume that it has acted arbitrarily?
The case of Eisenstadt v. Baird,17 although it was purportedly de-
cided under the rational relationship test, illustrates somewhat indirectly
the desirability of shifting the initial burden to the government. Like
Griswold, this case involved a statute interfering with a person's right to
use contraceptives.8" Rather than attempting to determine the nature of
the plaintiff's asserted right, however, the Court first examined the
state's rationale for the legislation. 9 The Court found that there could
be no rational relationship between the operation of the statute and any
legitimate state purpose, and declared the law unconstitutional.90 By
merely reversing the order in which it scrutinized the competing inter-
ests, then, the Court avoided the tortuous chore of finding a constitu-
tional source of the plaintiffs right.9  His right to personhood was
sufficient to carry the day.
A similar approach could have been used in Griswold. Mr. Justice
White asserted that "[a]t most the broad ban is of marginal utility to the
declared objective ' 92 and even a dissenter found the statute to be
"uncommonly silly."93 Why should we go any further? If the state is
to infringe upon the personhood of its citizens, it must at least be able to
demonstrate that the infringement furthers some legitimate state objec-
tive. If the Court had first required such a showing, it would have been
87. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88. The statute prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. Id. at
440-41 & n.2.
89. Id. at 447-55.
90. Id. at 443, 454-55.
91. The Court acknowledged with apparent relief the conservation of judicial energy
which had resulted from this simple reversal process:
Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon
fundamental freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would have
to be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to
the achievement of a compelling state interest .... But. .. we do not have
to address the statute's validity under that test because the law fails to satisfy
even the more lenient equal protection standard. Id. at 447 n.7 (emphasis by
the Court).
92. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Counsel for the appellant in Griswold later
recounted that "a factual demonstration that the law was arbitrary, unreasonable,
capricious, and not reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose did not pose serious
difficulties." Emerson, supra note 7, at 219.
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able to dispose of the case without straining the Constitution and
virtually foreclosing future regulation in this area. 4
The only apparent difference between these two cases is that Eisen-
stadt was analyzed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 5 while Griswold was a due process case. In the last few
years there have been indications that, under equal protection analysis,
the Supreme Court will undertake to impose a "rational relationship"
test which cannot be satisfied by a mere hypothetical or speculative
rationale." This phenomenon has been accompanied by -a correspond-
ing reluctance to recognize new fundamental rights or suspect classifica-
tions.07  The Court has insisted that the challenged classification "rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation ..... ,8 In Reed v. Reed,99 for exam-
ple, the Court refused to rule that sex classifications are suspect 00 and,
therefore, did not subject to "strict scrutiny" an Idaho statute which
provided that, as between persons equally qualified to administer estates,
males must be preferred to females. 1 1 Nevertheless, this did not pre-
clude the Court from assessing the reasonableness of the statute in a
meaningful way. Its conclusion was that the regulation represented an
"arbitrary legislative choice" which did not promote the asserted objec-
tive, reducing the workload of probate courts, in a manner consistent
with the equal protection clause.'0 2 Similarly, in Stanton v. Stanton03
94. A similar situation arose in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). A school board regulation requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave
several months before the expected date of birth was held to be violative of the teacher's
fundamental right to decide whether and when to have a child. The case could have
been decided without an expansion of the right to marital privacy since the Court also
found that the regulation had "no rational relationship to the valid state interest[s]"
asserted. Id. at 643-46. See note 91 supra.
95. 405 U.S. at 443.
96. See Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. Cur. L. REv. 807, 817-22 (1973).
97. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HAgv. L. REv. 1, 12-16 (1972).
98. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971), both cases quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
(emphasis added).
99. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
100. A plurality of the Court did elevate sex to the level of a "suspect classification"
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), finding "implicit support for such
an approach" in Reed. Id.
101. 404 U.S. at 73.
102. Id. at 76.
103, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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the Court found that a child support statute which required a husband
to provide for his son until age twenty-one but entitled his daughter to
support only until age eighteen imposed "criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of [the] statute."104
This method of analyzing the relationship between the means and
ends of governmental regulation, which is concerned with the reality of
the relationship rather than depending entirely upon the label attached
to the right or classification, 105 could also be appropriately applied
under the due process clause. Indeed, the language of Reed seems to
have originated in Nebbia v. New York," 6 a due process case (post-
Lochner, pre-Skrupa) which required that "the means selected . . .
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be at-
tained.'' 7  The Court's refusal to restore this more stringent version of
the "rational basis" test to due process analysis has had the not unpre-
dictable effect of forcing litigants to construct their arguments in more
"fashionable" equal protection terms.' 08 While such forensic adjust-
ments may take care of many cases, there still remain certain kinds of
governmental regulation which affect persons as individuals and not as
members of a particular class, and which simply cannot be fit realistical-
ly into the equal protection mold. 0 9 Laws governing the procurement
104. Id. at 14.
105. Professor Gunther described this new equal protection approach as an "intensi-
fied means scrutiny" which would "close the wide gap between . . . strict scrutiny...
and. . . minimal scrutiny by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to
genuine judicial inquiry." Gunther, supra note 97, at 24. Thus, the Court would be
compelled to "take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally
abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends." Id. at 20.
106. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
107. Id. at 525.
108. See, e.g., Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974), striking down a city
ordinance which permitted the municipal water department to terminate service to
tenants of landlords who bad failed to pay an outstanding bill even though the tenant's
individual account was current. In order to bring the ordinance within the purview of
the equal protection clause, the plaintiff alleged, and the court agreed, that those seeking
water services were divided into two categories: "applicants whose contemplated service
address is encumbered with a pre-existing debt (for which they are not liable) and
applicants whose residence lacks the stigma of such charges." Id. at 144. The court
then applied the equal protection version of the "rational basis" test and found the
classification to be unreasonable. Id. While the case is admittedly support for the
argument that we need not worry about due process because all due process cases have
some comparative aspects and are therefore susceptible to equal protection analysis, I
think the case more clearly indicates that at some point equal protection arguments
become too tenuous. The court's acceptance of this artificial analysis can be attributed
to its recognition that, unless it did so, this patently unfair ordinance would escape
judicial review.
109. The distinction between equal protection and due process has been explained as
follows:
Why equal protection rather than due process is called into play in any partic-
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of an abortion are an example, as are haircut regulations."10 In these
cases, the fact that the individual right asserted may or may not be
deemed "fundamental" should not exempt the regulation from meaning-
ful judicial review.' This is particularly so when the only apparent
reason why the Court is gun-shy in cases arising under the due process
clause is the fact that "due process carries a repulsive connotation of
value-laden intervention ,,,l as -reflected in the disdain for
Lochner.
I am not convinced, however, that Lochnering is an all-or-nothing
proposition. I believe that our courts are perfectly capable of examin-
ing regulations which infringe upon less-than-fundamental rights in
order to insure that the state does not act arbitrarily and that personhood
is preserved to the maximum extent consistent with an orderly society.
The equal protection cases support my confidence in the judiciary."x 3 In
addition, Professor Ely has pointed out that permitting courts to make
case-by-case assessments of the reasonableness of regulations in the
spirit of Lochner would be less "dangerous" to the Constitution than
continuing to apply a Roe-type analysis." 4 Lochner did not create any
fundamental right. The Court simply asked if the legislation involved
furthered some legitimate governmental objective."15  The verdict of
ular case is in the first instance a question of whether the law in issue attempts
either to classify ostensibly different cases as similar or to make apparently
similar cases different. Cases not involving some asserted form of one-for-one
comparability with other cases, but raising solely questions of fair treatment,
invoke due process rather than equal protection. Goodpaster, The Constitution
and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 479, 512 n.110 (1973).
110. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968), suggested that refusing to provide an
education to male students wearing long hair is a denial of equal protection. Id. This
approach was not adopted by any of the lower courts which overturned hair regulations.
See note 47 supra.
111. Professor Goodpaster has suggested that, since both due process and equal
protection are grounded in fairness considerations, claims arising under either clause can
be measured by the same standard: "[Tihe government must be fair, and the only way
to determine whether it has been fair is to weigh and balance its purposes and method of
regulation against the interests regulated and to examine, in view of the government's
ends, the consequences of the regulation on the regulated." Goodpaster, supra note 109,
at 513. I agree that the standard of reasonableness by which governmental regulations
are measured should not vary with the constitutional guarantee which the action is
alleged to have infringed. To a large extent, this Article represents an effort to show
how ideas such as those discussed by Professor Goodpaster can be given practical effect
by members of the judiciary.
112. Gunther, supra note 97, at 42.
113. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971) (in which the Court subjected state allocations of welfare benefits to
minimal scrutiny and found them reasonable).
114. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 940, 943 (1973).
115. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
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history is that the Court misapplied this test; the state's interest in
regulation of labor-management relations clearly outweighs an individu-
al entrepreneur's right to run his own business. Roe, on the other hand,
explicitly created a fundamental right to an abortion which can only be
overcome by demonstrating a compelling state interest. 1 6 This stan-
dard was applied despite the fact that, unlike in Griswold,"17 the statute
in Roe was found to promote a permissible governmental purpose, the
protection of the mother's health."18
I think that this type of analysis is artificial and simply tends to
obscure the way in which a particular decision was reached."19 As
Learned Hand wrote, the term "fundamental" is one "whose office
usually, though quite innocently, is to disguise what [judges] are doing
and impute to it a derivation far more impressive than their personal
preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision."'20 When
dealing with individual rights which are not specifically protected by the
Constitution, the courts are simply engaged in a balancing exercise. The
individual's right to be let alone must, in each instance, be weighed
against the state interest asserted and the rationality of the means chosen
to accomplish this objective. Two things are then obvious. First, in
order for the balancing process to work properly, the operator of the
scales must have all the facts. The state must be compelled to articulate
its reasons for the regulation. Second, where there are no weights on
the state's side of the scales, the individual's right of personhood must
prevail. I believe that this is, in fact, the process which is employed by
judges and that, in many cases, the labelling of an asserted right as
"fundamental" simply means that it outweighs the asserted state interest
in that particular instance.' 2 ' I also believe that the existence of such
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
117. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text.
118. 410 U.S. at 153-54; see Ely, supra note 114, at 941-42 & n.117. An example
of the unfortunate side effects of raising the right to an abortion to fundamental status is
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1153-54 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975), in which the court decided that no health
and safety restrictions, regardless of their reasonableness, could be placed on first
trimester abortions.
119. "Indeed, all of our recent constitutional history would have been more coherent,
and more satisfying to the Justices and to the various consumers of their constitutional
product, had the Supreme Court never abandoned substantive due process but had merely
excised its laissez-faire excrescence." Henkin, supra note 11, at 1427. See also
Comment, supra note 96, at 827-30.
120. L. HAND, THE BmL oF RIGHTs 70 (1958).
121. Professor Henkin has complained that, by continuing the present approach,
we will know which rights are and which are not within the zone (of privacy]
only case by case, with lines drawn and redrawn, in response to individual and
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ad hoc balancing should not be a source of fear which requires that
reality be concealed. As Professor Sutherland observed, "If anyone
rebels at the thought of entrusting this power to the nine Justices, he may
well consider for a while to whom he would prefer to entrust it; this can
be a sobering experience."' 22
CONCLUSION
I think that the rights of man are literally innumerable, but that very
few of them deserve to be labelled "fundamental." The remaining ones
are of varying degrees of importance and are legitimately subject to
regulation in pursuance of a countervailing state interest. Under the
currently employed judicial method of vindicating individual rights,
however, the state is given virtually complete discretion in the regulation
of lesser rights, while being precluded from interfering with those rights
deemed fundamental. This seems to me to be an extreme approach
which blocks effective state action on one end while permitting unwar-
ranted infringements upon personal liberty on the other end. I suggest
that a preferable approach would be to concede the state's potential
interest in any area and to litigate the extent of it. At the same time, I
suggest that it would not be unfair to government to presume the
legitimacy of an asserted right of personhood and thereafter to direct
inquiry to whether the state's interest is sufficiently strong to justify
infringement. Results would largely depend upon fact determinations,
the making of which is a traditional court function.
All of what I have said rests upon a crucial premise: that govern-
ment may not act capriciously and arbitrarily to make rules and law that
do not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
If I am wrong about that, I am wrong about all of it.
societal initiatives and the imaginativeness of lawyers. Henkin, supra note 11,
at 1426.
I believe that there are significant differences between the approach I am espousing
and Mr. Justice Marshall's "sliding scale." His approach "clearly comprehends varia-
tions in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications
depending . . . on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected .... " San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (dissenting opinion). Under my analysis, the initial task is to identify and
weigh the state interest rather than to ascertain the "societal importance of the interest
adversely affected." This procedural difference could be decisive in situations in which
the individual and state interests are minimal. I would prefer that the close cases at this
level be decided in favor of the individual.
122. Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REv. 283, 288 (1965).
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